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Abstract
Background: We present a novel approach for exiting coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) lockdowns using a ‘risk
scorecard’ to prioritize activities to resume whilst allowing safe reopening.
Methods: We modelled cases generated in the community/week, incorporating parameters for social distancing,
contact tracing and imported cases. We set thresholds for cases and analysed the effect of varying parameters.
An online tool to facilitate country-specific use including the modification of parameters (https://sshsphdemos.shi
nyapps.io/covid_riskbudget/) enables visualization of effects of parameter changes and trade-offs. Local outbreak
investigation data from Singapore illustrate this.
Results: Setting a threshold of 0.9 mean number of secondary cases arising from a case to keep R < 1, we showed
that opening all activities excluding high-risk ones (e.g. nightclubs) allows cases to remain within threshold; while
opening high-risk activities would exceed the threshold and result in escalating cases. An 80% reduction in imported
cases per week (141 to 29) reduced steady-state cases by 30% (295 to 205). One-off surges in cases (due to
superspreading) had no effect on the steady state if the R remains <1. Increasing the effectiveness of contact tracing
(probability of a community case being isolated when infectious) by 33% (0.6 to 0.8) reduced cases by 22% (295
to 231). Cases grew exponentially if the product of the mean number of secondary cases arising from a case and
(1—probability of case being isolated) was >1.
Conclusions: Countries can utilize a ‘risk scorecard’ to balance relaxations for travel and domestic activity depending
on factors that reduce disease impact, including hospital/ICU capacity, contact tracing, quarantine and vaccination.
The tool enabled visualization of the combinations of imported cases and activity levels on the case numbers and
the trade-offs required. For vaccination, a reduction factor should be applied both for likelihood of an infected case
being present and a close contact getting infected.
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Introduction
To halt the spread of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19),
many countries imposed a combination of border control mea-
sures, stay-home-orders, shut-down of activities and physical
distancing, generally referred to as ‘lockdown’ measures. The
economic and social costs of these widespread lockdowns have
been severe.1 ,2 The long-term imposition of lockdown measures
is not sustainable socially, economically and politically. Many
countries exited from their first lockdowns with varying success
in sustained control of COVID-19 transmission.3 Even countries
lauded for their initial effective lockdown policies have met with
second waves of infection due to seeding of cases from inbound
travel or relaxation of domestic control policies, resulting in
the re-imposition of lockdown measures in many countries.4–8
Frequent re-imposition of measures leads to substantial eco-
nomic and social fallout and is undesirable. Lockdowns have
given countries time to build up community public health mea-
sures, testing capabilities, improve contact tracing abilities and
increase healthcare capacity. Used appropriately, these tools can
aid countries in exiting lockdowns in a safe and sustainable
manner.
The relaxation of lockdown measures requires a delicate
balancing act—to allow enough of the economy and society to
function whilst ensuring that case numbers are kept within the
ability of containment capabilities to prevent runaway epidemics,
and within the capacity of the healthcare system, to prevent
over-burdening of medical resources that may lead to increased
morbidity and mortality. Trade-offs are necessary—as opening
up international travel increases the possibility of imported cases
though mitigated by the restrictions placed on travellers, and
needs to be balanced against the relaxation of restrictions on
domestic activity, in order to ensure lower rates of transmis-
sion arising from community cases. Trade-offs between various
domestic activities also have to be made in order to keep the
risk of community transmission and hence case numbers below
acceptable limits. At the same time, testing and contact tracing
capabilities can reduce the potential spread of community cases,
hence allow for a greater degree of social interaction.
We searched PubMed, BioRxiv and MedRxiv for articles
published in English from inception to 1 Dec 2020, with the key-
words ‘2019-nCoV’, ‘novel coronavirus’, ‘COVID-19’, ‘SARS-
CoV-2’ AND ‘testing’, ‘importation risk’, ‘social distancing’,
reproduction number’, ‘R0’, ‘transmission’. We found various
papers that considered the impact of imported cases, relaxation
of social distancing measures and various testing and quarantine
regimes on transmission, as independent factors. We have not
found any papers that have attempted to study the effects of these
various measures in combination.
We propose a novel approach to decision-making for exiting
from lockdown using a ‘risk scorecard’. It is premised on the
fact that at any point in time, a society and healthcare system
can accept a certain level of risk of transmission of cases—
within which various economic and social activities can func-
tion, beyond which there will be containment and healthcare
system collapses, resulting in an uncontrolled surge in cases and
ultimately mortalities.
We describe a model to enable the calculation of the effect
of imported cases from travellers, and various community-based
societal activities on disease transmission and their summation,
considering the impact of mitigating measures such as social dis-
tancing policies, testing and containment/contact tracing capabil-
ities. With its widely available data on various COVID-19-related
parameters, the city-state of Singapore has used this approach to
open up its society and economy.
The intent of this tool is to allow policy makers around
the world to weigh the relative impact of various activities in
their contexts in order to prioritize a basket of activities to
resume that remains within the overall risk score. The param-
eters of the model can be adapted for use in a country based
on specific requirements. An online tool has been developed
(hosted on https://sshsphdemos.shinyapps.io/covid_riskbudget/)
which enables visualization of the effects of various parameter
changes on case numbers and trade-offs to be considered.
Methods
Determining the contributions of a population’s
activities to the budget
For household and workplace activities, we estimated the mean
number of secondary cases that would arise should there be a
single case in a household/workplace, using observed attack rates
and average number of close contacts based on local outbreak
investigation data.
For social activities, we estimated the mean number of sec-
ondary cases that would arise from a case based on all social
activities engaged by the population. This was the sum of the
mean number of secondary cases arising from a case based on
each activity, which is determined by the baseline probability
of infection assuming a case talking to other contact(s), none
of whom are wearing any personal protective equipment (PPE),
relative risk of the activity, estimated number of close contacts
a case would have during that activity and likelihood of a case
attending that activity.
The overall mean number of secondary cases arising from
a case based on all activities undertaken by the population
(Soverall)is thus the sum of the mean number of secondary cases
arising from a case based on households, workplaces and activi-
ties undertaken by the population. Figure 1a provides an outline
of how these values are calculated, with more details in the
supplementary appendix.
Determining the weekly incidence
Given a generation time of COVID-19 of 5.2 days,9 the number
of cases generated in the community in a week is estimated to be
a product of the number of cases in the previous week and the
overall mean number of secondary cases arising from a single
case based on activities undertaken by the population. Travellers
pose a risk by importing cases into the country based on the
incidence of COVID-19 in the country of travel origin—however,
this can be mitigated by testing and quarantine regimes for trav-
ellers to reduce the COVID-19 exposures from travellers into the
community. Travel therefore results in imported cases that do not
have community exposure and will need to be managed within
the healthcare capacity, and those that have community exposure
and may contribute to further transmission. Overall, the number
of cases in the previous week is contributed by imported cases
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Figure 1. a: Calculation of mean number of secondary cases arising from a single case based on all activities undertaken by the population (Soverall)
b: Calculation of notified cases per week.
and community cases and is influenced by traveller quarantine
and testing regimes and contact tracing capabilities in the com-
munity respectively. Figure 1b provides an outline of how the
number of notified cases per week is calculated, with more details
in the supplementary appendix.
There will be a proportion of imported/community cases
that will not be notified, i.e. they will not be picked up
through active COVID testing or by presenting themselves
for treatment at healthcare facilities. These cases that are
not notified will contribute to community transmission the
following week but will not utilize healthcare resources. Only
the notified cases will utilize healthcare resources hence this
is the number that should be kept within an acceptable
level.
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To assess the impact of change of various parameters on
the number of notified cases per week, we simulated a variety
of scenarios using the Singapore population as an example.
Singapore is a city-state in Southeast Asia with a population of
5.7 million as of November 2020.10 Values used were approxi-
mations of the situation in Singapore as of August 2020, after
the lifting of control measures in June 2020. The values used in
our calculations are summarized in Table 1 below.
Setting a budget
The aim of the risk scorecard is to keep the weekly incidence of
notified cases stable and below acceptable limits over time.
Once a threshold level is set for the mean number of sec-
ondary cases arising from a case based on all activities under-
taken by population, the amount and nature of activities (e.g.
event size, requirement for mask-wearing, number of close con-
tacts) can be altered to obtain a combination that allows the
mean number of secondary cases to remain below this threshold.
For our calculations, we set the threshold at 0.9, to allow for
some buffer due to uncertainty in the scale of social interactions
so that the mean number of secondary cases does not exceed 1.
Similarly, a threshold number of notified cases per week must
be set. Within this threshold, exact quantities of the various
parameters can be altered to obtain a number of combinations
where the number of notified cases per week is below the
threshold. For our calculations, we set the threshold of notified
cases per week as 350, where the contact tracing and healthcare
system can sustainably cope over long periods of time.
All analyses were performed in R11.
Results
Determining further activities that can be
resumed based on the threshold level set for the
mean number of secondary cases arising from all
activities undertaken by population
With a threshold of 0.9 mean number of secondary cases arising
from a case based on all activities undertaken by the population
and the household and workplace settings contributing already
contributing 0.38 secondary cases per case, we determined that
social activities allowed in the population should not contribute
more than 0.52 secondary cases per case.
Table 2 shows a worked example of types of activities that are
under consideration for reopening. These calculations indicate
that opening all activities excluding choirs and nightclubs would
result in fewer than 0.52 secondary cases per week per case hence
stay within the threshold, whereas opening all activities including
choirs and nightclubs would result in more than 0.52 secondary
cases per week per case, and hence exceed the threshold.
Effect of varying parameters on notified cases
per week
Imputing base-case scenario numbers for all parameters resulted
in steady-state notified cases per week of 364, which is slightly
in excess of the set threshold of 350. The value of current
community cases (week 0) did not have an effect on the eventual
steady-state notified cases per week. A decrease from 141 to
29 imported cases per week, all else unchanged, resulted in
a reduction of steady-state notified cases per week from 295
to 205. An increase to 282 imported cases per week resulted
an increase in the steady-state notified cases per week to 409
(Figure 2a).
One-off large surges in case numbers of various numbers
of cases at various time points resulted in a short-term surge
in notified cases per week above the threshold but had no
effect on the steady state (Figure 2b). Increasing the probability
of a community case being isolated from 0.6 to 0.8 reduced
steady-state NW from 295 to 231. Reducing the probability
of a community case being isolated from 0.6 to 0.4 reduced
steady-state notified cases per week from 295 to 406 (Figure 2c).
We tested a range of combinations of values for the proba-
bility of a community case being isolated and mean number of
secondary cases arising from a case based on all activities under-
taken by the population to consider the joint effects of contact
tracing and quarantine capabilities and changes in community
activity levels. An exponential growth of notified cases week-on-
week will result if the product of the mean number of secondary
cases arising from a case based on all activities undertaken by
the population and (1—probability of a community case being
isolated) is >1 (Figure 2d). Finally, we plotted the values of
imported cases per week and mean number of secondary cases
arising from a case based on all activities undertaken by the
population that would result in the a steady-state number of
notified cases within the threshold, keeping all other variables
constant at baseline values. Any combination of imported cases
per week and mean number of secondary cases arising from a
case based on all activities undertaken by the population that is
below the curve will result in notified cases staying within the
threshold (Figure 3).
Discussion
The risk scorecard presents a conceptual framework and quan-
titative way of mapping out the complex interactions between
the various components of transmission risk and mitigating
factors that affect case numbers within a population. It allows
easy visualization of the various policy decisions and trade-offs
that have to be made in order to keep case numbers within
a defined threshold. Values of the parameters can be changed
to reflect the situation in respective countries or improvements
in the effectiveness of mitigation measures based on research
developments. Some countries have high prevalence of recovered
and presumably immune individuals, and with the introduction
of vaccines the level of immunity could be even higher through
vaccination programs. The immunity level and the corresponding
reduction in risk of infection can easily be included in the
model to determine the risk score allowable under these new
parameters. This would also allow policy makers to perform
forward planning on what vaccinations could do for opening
up society and the economy, and should be explored in future
research studies.
In deciding which activities to resume, trade-offs have to
be made based on socio-economic-political considerations. For
example, activities that score highly on Sactivity, hence take up a
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Injection of cases from
unforeseen
superspreading events
in the previous week
(where cases only
surface 1 week later)
Baseline 0.9 100 141 0.95 0.6 0.5 0.1 100, each week from
week 1–10
Varying no. of imported cases
1 0.9 100 29 0.95 0.6 0.5 0.1 100, each week from
week 1–10
2 0.9 100 282 0.95 0.6 0.5 0.1 100, each week from
week 1–10
Sudden injects of additional cases at a specific week to simulate a large cluster from a one-off super-spreading event
3 0.9 100 141 0.95 0.6 0.5 0.1 100 (week 1 through
10), additional 30 at
week 4
4 0.9 100 141 0.95 0.6 0.5 0.1 100 (week 1 through
10), additional 50 at
week 4
5 0.9 100 141 0.95 0.6 0.5 0.1 100 (week 1 through
10), additional 100
at week 4
6 0.9 100 141 0.95 0.6 0.5 0.1 100 (week 1 through
10), additional 100
at week 2
Varying the likelihood of a community case being isolated (i.e. effectiveness of contact tracing and quarantine)
7 0.9 100 141 0.95 0.8 0.5 0.1 100, each week from
week 1–10
8 0.9 100 141 0.95 0.4 0.5 0.1 100, each week from
week 1–10
Varying Soverall and ncomm together
9 1.7 100 141 0.95 0.6 0.5 0.1 100, each week from
week 1–10
10 2.1 100 141 0.95 0.6 0.5 0.1 100, each week from
week 1–10
11 0.9 100 141 0.95 0.4 0.5 0.1 100, each week from
week 1–10
12 1.7 100 141 0.95 0.4 0.5 0.1 100, each week from
week 1–10
13 2.1 100 141 0.95 0.4 0.5 0.1 100, each week from
week 1–10
significant proportion of Soverall, are those with (i) prolonged
droplet and aerosol generation (singing and loud talking),
(ii) lack of mask usage, and (iii) a large number of contacts. Such
activities include karaokes, nightclubs and bars and religious
congregational activities, all of which have resulted in a large
number of cases from a single/few positive case(s) attending
these events.11–13 These activities are also inherently social in
nature and safe distancing is difficult to practice. While they are
generally of low economic value, they may have a substantial
social or political lobby. While these activities in their pre-
COVID-19 form have a high risk score, the nature of these
activities can materially altered to reduce transmission in these
settings. Conversely, events where the audience is seated with
physical distancing, wearing masks, and do not generally interact
have low Sactivity. Many of these have also have high economic
or social value and may be prioritized to safely proceed.
Using the worked example of Singapore, where this approach
has been successfully implemented, several conclusions could
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friends, going to the
restaurant, movies
8 0.0000016 0.02 1 16 0.00000051 625 000 0.32 Yes
Smaller-scale concerts
with no talking
5000 0.001 0.02 0.0225 5 0.00000225 30 0.0000675 Yes
Meetings, Incentives,
Conferences, Exhibitions
5000 0.001 0.02 0.1125 30 0.0000675 50 0.003375 Yes
Choirs 50 0.00001 0.02 20 20 0.00008 300 0.024 No
Nightclubs 500 0.0001 0.02 20 50 0.002 300 0.6 No
Cultural celebrations and
commemorative events
1000 0.0002 0.02 20 50 0.004 15 0.06 Yes
Mass concerts, music
festivals and spectator
sports with shouting/ loud
talking
10 000 0.002 0.02 20 10 0.008 5 0.04 No
be drawn. Firstly, in systems where each infected individual
spreads to less than one person (i.e. reproduction number, R < 1),
imported cases constitute ‘injects’ that may lead to further gener-
ations of community transmission, though overall case numbers
will eventually drop to steady state, even in the face of continuing
imported cases. The number of imported cases depends on the
number of inbound travellers and the community incidence rates
in the countries of origin. Effective travel restrictions, traveller
quarantine and testing policies will reduce the number of infec-
tious imported cases that interact with the community and result
in further generations of cases.
In particular, countries that serve as major air transportation
hubs are prone to disease importation and subsequent large-scale
community transmission, including new Variants of Concern.
Prompt imposition of restrictions on air travel when there is
local transmission from travellers in the destination country
was shown to be effective in reducing spread.14 For incoming
travellers, quarantine for the incubation period and testing upon
arrival and before release will reduce community transmission.
A study15 found that 79.6% of infected travellers are infectious
upon arrival; screening with a 14-day isolation of test-positives
followed by a negative test achieves a 91.7% reduction in sec-
ondary cases, versus only a 55.4% reduction for no screening but
a 7-day mandatory quarantine. The degree of reduction can be
further modified by altering the risk profile of travellers entering.
Restricting arrivals to countries with low incidence rates or to
vaccinated individuals, or imposing a quota on travellers from
countries of higher risk or unvaccinated individuals, has been
effective in preventing a surge in cases in the receiving country16;
however this policy needs to be frequently reviewed in response
to epidemic trends and vaccine effectiveness.
It is noted that both imported cases that enter the community
and those that are detected during quarantine will exert
pressure on healthcare resources. Countries should also consider
imposing requirements for pre-departure testing in order to
reduce the healthcare impact of imported cases. The current
utility of an ‘immunity certificate’ where a traveller can be
documented as having recovered from COVID-19 or been
vaccinated is unclear, as that is insufficient to address several
concerns,17 including the level and durability of immunity and
whether they preclude shedding of transmissible virus, whether
antibody tests are required for verification. Nevertheless,
recovered and/or vaccinated travellers could have certain
exemptions, e.g. reductions to the duration of quarantine, if the
assessed risk is similar to a COVID-19-naïve traveller without
exemptions.
The effect of seeding by imported cases on a background
of lax social distancing policies (and where R > 1) should not
be discounted—in Singapore, imported cases from returning
residents in March seeded an outbreak among foreign workers
and led to over 50 000 PCR-confirmed cases in foreign worker
dormitories.18 Countries that are considering relaxing travel
restrictions to allow more travellers to enter should therefore
consider maintaining social distancing measures (including mask
mandates) in order to keep community transmission risks low
(i.e. maintain R < 1) and case numbers within manageable levels.
A good system of containment measures including contact
tracing, testing and quarantine operations is an enabler for
allowing a greater range of activities to resume. The widespread
deployment of digital contact tracing tools may play a key
role in improve the speed and completeness of quarantine of
close contacts and therefore remove cases from circulating the
community.19–22 The proportion of first-generation community
cases remaining in the community (a function of the effectiveness
of containment measures) and the number of second-generation
cases arising from all activities undertaken by a particular case
are inversely correlated at a given threshold of new cases per
week, and the multiple of these two parameters should not
exceed 1—otherwise, exponential increase in cases will occur.
Even the best contact tracing system is unlikely to detect and
remove 100% of contacts and cases from circulation in the com-
munity; therefore it would be prudent to maintain some degree
of limitations on social activities compared to the pre-COVID-19
era.
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Figure 2. Weekly notified cases based on respective scenarios. (a) Varying number of imported cases per week, (b) one-off surges in cases at respective
time points, (c) varying probability of a community case being isolated, (d) varying imported cases and mean number of secondary cases arising
from a case based on arising from all activities undertaken by the population on notified cases per week.
Having effective containment measures coupled with cali-
brated opening of social activities also allows the population
to withstand the impact of one-off superspreading events that
may produce large numbers of first-generation cases. All else
unchanged, even after such one-off superspreading events, the
number of new cases per week will eventually return to a steady-
state, while the healthcare system may be placed under strain
for a period of time, necessitating surge capacity to be in place.
Therefore, it would be prudent to include a buffer in the risk
scorecard to account for secondary unknown and unanticipated
effects of further relaxations (e.g. a primary activity creating
opportunities for further interaction), ongoing higher risk activ-
ities that are not known to governments, and reaction time for
unexpected events.
Community-based testing is another tool that will need to be
considered, as testing as part of surveillance or active case-finding
will help to identify cases for early isolation and contact tracing.
Pre-event testing can also be used to reduce the probability of
an infectious COVID-19 case entering an event and reduces the
overall risk of secondary spread for any given activity, all else
being equal. Conversely, reduction of risk from pre-event testing
would also mean that the number of people participating in
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Figure 3. Allowable number of imported cases per week for respective
mean number of secondary cases arising from all activities undertaken
by the population at a fixed health care capacity of 350 persons per
week, based on (i) Probability of an imported case being notified (ratio of
imported cases picked up during quarantine: all imported cases) of 0.95;
(ii) Probability of a case in the community being isolated (indicating
contact tracing efficiency) of 0.6; (iii) Proportion of notified imported
cases who are infectious and have exposure to susceptible contacts of
0.5; and (iv) Proportion of notified community cases who are infectious
and have exposure to susceptible contacts of 1.
any activity could increase while maintaining the overall activity
budget.
There are several limitations to this study. This is a simplified
model that supports policy making and is easy to use, but does
not account for behavioural changes across time, which may
occur in response to changes in policies or fatigue from prolonged
imposition of social distancing measures resulting in decreasing
compliance. We have also assumed that the disease parameters
are fixed over a 7-day timeframe, and that the following genera-
tion of cases will be captured exactly after 7 days. We have made
the model code available on https://sshsphdemos.shinyapps.io/co
vid_riskbudget/, which can be modified by the end-user. Finally,
the accuracy of outcomes is highly dependent on the quality of
input data. This may be a challenge in countries where there are
limited data on COVID-19 transmission or an inability to control
or predict the population’s activities. Nevertheless, the simplicity
of the model allows parameters to be changed when new data
become available for dynamic policy making.
Conclusion
The risk scorecard enables easy visualization of the relative
effects of various societal activities and mitigation measures on
COVID-19 case numbers. It shows that it is possible for a society
to resume a wide range of activities for majority of the population
whilst keeping the risks of an outbreak low. These are generally
activities where masks are worn and there is limited talking and
aerosol generation. For higher risk activities, resumption should
be coupled with mitigating measures such as frequent testing
of patrons/staff, vaccination and improved ventilation of indoor
venues.
In opening travel, countries should take a risk-based
approach. The number of imported cases can be managed
upstream by imposing pre-departure testing/vaccination require-
ments and restrictions on number of arrivals from high-risk
countries. Once in country, stringent testing and quarantine
requirements can be imposed. Countries should also avoid
relaxing both travel restrictions and domestic community
restrictions at the same time, in order to keep overall community
transmission risks low (i.e. maintain R < 1).
The wave of infections experienced by many countries exiting
from lockdown highlights the importance of trade-offs when
resuming social activities. In the absence of long-lasting herd
immunity provided by widespread use of a COVID-19 vaccine,
any society’s attempt to return to normalcy with consequent
increase in social interactions will need to be carefully calibrated
in order to achieve maximum economic and social gains whilst
minimizing the cost to health and lives. Policy makers should
consider this risk score approach when making decisions about
what activities should be resumed, investment in containment
and testing capabilities, and building surge capacities.
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